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Abstract—Research on mixed-criticality scheduling has flour-
ished since Vestal’s seminal 2007 paper, but more efforts are
needed in order to make these results more suitable for industrial
adoption and robust and versatile enough to influence the
evolution of future certification standards in keeping up with
the times. With this in mind, we introduce a more refined
task model, in line with the fundamental principles of Vestal’s
mode-based adaptive mixed-criticality model, which allows a
task’s criticality and its importance to be specified independently
from each other. A task’s importance is the criterion that
determines its presence in different system modes. Meanwhile,
the task’s criticality (reflected in its Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
and defining the rules for its software development process),
prescribes the degree of conservativeness for the task’s estimated
WCET during schedulability testing. We indicate how such a task
model can help resolve some of the perceived weaknesses of the
Vestal model, in terms of how it is interpreted, and demonstrate
how the existing scheduling tests for the classic variant’s of
Vestal’s model can be mapped to the new task model essentially
without changes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
Mixed-criticality systems are an important niche of real-
time embedded systems, their defining characteristic being the
fact that computing tasks of different criticalities execute on
the same hardware and share system resources1. The criticality
of a task is a measure of the severity of the consequences of
a task failing (which, in the context of real-time scheduling
means missing its deadline). Indeed, some tasks missing their
deadline can have catastrophic consequences, whereas other
tasks occasionally missing their deadlines might only have a
minor effect. For this reason, the higher a task’s criticality,
the more conservative (and costlier, in terms of effort, time
and money) the approach employed to upper-bound that task’s
worst-case execution time2.
The sharing of system resources among tasks of different
criticalities, unless carefully managed, can give rise to unde-
sirable interactions that compromise safety. For this reason,
Work partially supported by National Funds through FCT (Portuguese Foundation for
Science and Technology) within the CISTER Research Unit (CEC/04234).
1When tasks of different criticalities exist but are completely isolated,
such systems are multiple-criticality, as opposed to mixed-criticality, and they
constitute a different class of systems. See Footnote 1 in [1] and in [2].
2In Steve Vestal’s words: “ . . . the more confidence one needs in a task
execution time bound (the less tolerant one is of missed deadlines), the larger
and more conservative that bound tends to become in practice.” [3]
and before getting to specific scheduling arrangements, the
various certification authorities generally prescribe that (i) ap-
plications of lower criticality should not be able to cause the
failure of tasks of higher criticality, and (ii) when tasks of
different criticality share the same resources, they must all be
engineered to the same strict standard of safety as the highest-
criticality task thereamong. Clearly, this is inefficient. For this
reason the certification authorities, in their guidelines [4], do
not insist in zero interference among mixed-criticality appli-
cations, but instead expect such interference to be carefully
accounted for and adequately mitigated3. In the context of
the WCET problem, also analysing low-criticality tasks using
highly conservative and pessimistic static WCET analysis
techniques, as in the case of highly-critical components, would
be wasteful of processing capacity. In fact, it would defeat the
purpose behind the strong industrial shift to mixed-criticality
scheduling, which is to efficiently utilise today’s powerful
multicores and reduce costs, size, weight and power.
B. Vestal’s model and its evolution
This reality motivated Vestal to propose the use of differ-
ent WCET estimates with different corresponding degrees of
assurance, for the same task, in different scenarios, in order
to ensure a priori the correct temporal behavior of the system
at run-time [3]. To illustrate the principle, consider a fixed-
priority-scheduled system and assume that each task has both
a (i) “reasonable” but, not conclusively safe, WCET estimate
and (ii) a highly pessimistic, but demonstrably safe, WCET
estimate. Then, when testing the schedulability of a low-
criticality task, one would only need to use the “reasonable”
estimates, for all higher-priority tasks, irrespectively of their
criticality, as inputs to the familiar Worst-Case Response
Time (WCRT) analysis [5] for the task under consideration.
Conversely, testing the schedulability of a high-criticality task,
one would use the respective pessimistic estimates. This initial
model, coupled with a fixed task priority scheduling policy,
was termed Static Mixed Criticality (SMC).
Baruah and Burns extended Vestal’s initial model [6] by
adding modes and the notion of run-time system criticality lev-
3For example, the CAST-32A guidelines [4], clarify that “it is therefore
important to identify the interference channels that could cause interference
between the software applications hosted by their MCP platform, to mitigate
the effects of each of those interference channels and to verify the selected
means of mitigation”.
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el. We will henceforth refer to their model as the Mode-based
Vestal model. In this variant model, each task has a (design)
criticality level and a set of WCET estimates – one for every
criticality level not exceeding its own and non-decreasing with
respect to the latter. At startup, the “system criticality level”
(in reality, an index of the system mode) is initialised to the
lowest task criticality. If a task exceeds its WCET for the
system’s current criticality level, the system stops all tasks
with criticality equal to that level and increments its criticality
level. This constitutes a mode change, upon which, all tasks
with criticalities lower than the current system criticality, are
idled. Coupled with fixed-priority scheduling, the mode-based
Vestal model is known as Adaptive Mixed Criticality (AMC),
but the model itself is orthogonal to the scheduling policy. For
example, it can be coupled with EDF [7], [8].
The execution time monitoring and dropping of lower-
criticality tasks that exceed their WCET estimate for a given
mode was a clever idea for the following reason: If a task
cannot execute for more than a certain time (corresponding
to that WCET estimate) without getting dropped, then that
estimate (which could even be an underestimation of its
true WCET), becomes a provably safe, unexceedable WCET
estimate for the task – it will never execute for more than
that. This solves the problem of unpredictable interference on
higher-criticality tasks, assuming that it is acceptable to drop
lower-criticality tasks, during the mode change, in the first
place. This assumption in AMC may, however, not always
hold, as we will discuss later, in Section I-D.
C. Terminological issues
On a related observation, and to quell some long-standing
terminology-related confusion, we note what were above re-
ferred to as “WCET estimates” (or often simply “WCETs”)
for a given task in different modes, are in reality execution
time thresholds for triggering a switch to the next-higher
mode. Except for the estimates used in the top-most mode
(which need to provably upper-bound the true, but unknown
WCETs), the estimates (i.e., thresholds) used in other modes
are reasonably expected, but not required, to upper-bound the
true WCET. However, too low a value increases the probability
of a mode change (undesirable, due to the degradation of
functionality entailed by dropping tasks) while a value that is
too high wastes processing resources. In any case, the selection
of these thresholds is up to the designer. Another terminology-
related source of confusion is the use of the term “system
criticality” to denote what is, essentially, an indicator of the
mode. Strictly speaking, “criticality” characterises applications
and their tasks. This is discussed more in Section IV.
D. Other criticisms
Criticisms are sometimes voiced about the mode-based
Vestal model [9], [10], [11], [12], [13] and its compatibility
with the safety standards (e.g., IEC61508, ISO26262 or DO-
178C) on which system certification is based. This is partially
due to Vestal’s use of the term “criticality” in a looser sense
than the meaning it has in the standards (and the precedent
that this set in the use of the term in the acadamic literature)
and partially due to more legitimate concerns.
One of the more legitimate concerns, is that dropping tasks
upon a mode change simply on the basis of their criticality, is
not necessarily acceptable course of action in the general case.
More generally, a task’s criticality is not synonymous with its
importance, which is a different attribute – and important tasks
should not be discarded.
In response to such concerns, in this work we introduce
an extension of the mode-based Vestal model, whereby
the importance of a task is decoupled from its criticality,
and is specified separately. The participation of a task in
different modes follows from its importance, not its criticality.
Meanwhile, its criticality, which determines the degree of
conservativeness in its development process, also determines
(in our model, just as in the standard mode-based Vestal), the
degree of conservativeness in the estimation of its WCET in
the different modes that it forms part of.
Note that this use of the term “importance” is different from
that employed in [14] where it is simply used as a means of
differentiating between tasks of the same criticality.
E. Outline of this paper
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we describe this new model. In Section III, we describe how
the schedulability analyses developed for the standard mode-
based Vestal model can be mapped to the new decoupled
model, essentially without changes. Subsequently, in Sec-
tion IV, we discuss some of the existing criticisms to the
standard mode-based Vestal model, and how our new task
models addresses those. Section V offers concluding remarks.
II. THE DECOUPLED TASK MODEL
Consider a set τ
def
= {τ1, . . . τn} of n mixed-criticality
sporadic tasks. Each task τi has a minimum inter-arrival time
Ti and a relative deadline Di ≤ Ti. It also has a worst-
case execution time (WCET), whose exact value is in practice
unknowable, and can only be estimated. Different estimates
can be obtained for the same task by the use of different
techniques:
1) Provably safe WCET estimates, which are obtained by
formal analysis and/or static path analysis, with rigorous
pessimistic assumptions. They tend to be excessively
pessimistic and costly to derive, in terms of time, effort
and money.
2) Potentially unsafe WCET estimates, i.e., probably but
not provably safe. These may be derived by simplistic
path analysis, or via measurements and perhaps proba-
bilistic techniques.
Although Vestal’s model has been generalised to an arbitrary
number of criticality levels (denoted numerically), in this
work, for simplicity we assume just two criticality levels,
high (H) and low (L) – which suffice in order to illustrate
the principle. A task’s criticality is denoted by κi.
Under the variant of Vestal’s model introduced with AMC,
there would be two modes (L and H), with all tasks executing
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in the L-mode and only the H-tasks executing in the H-
mode. Instead, in our model, in addition to its criticality κi,
each task is also characterised by (what we conventionally
call) its importance λi, which in the general case is indicated
numerically. In this work, however, we assume that it can be
high (H) or low (L), for simplicity. This attribute, input by the
designer, reflects the design and application requirements and
the implication is that, if needed, a low-importance task can
be “dropped” (i.e., idled, at mode change) whereas a high-
importance task cannot. Therefore, under our model, which
tasks execute in which mode is determined on the basis of their
importance, not their criticality4. This is a more general model
than that by Baruah and Burns [6], which can be described as
a special case (namely, λi = κi, ∀i).
In accordance with the above principles, there exist 4
possible classes of tasks, corresponding to the possible com-
binations of criticality (κi ∈ {L, H}) and importance (λi ∈
{L, H}).
Tasks of high importance (irrespective of their criticality)
can also sub-categorised into (i) tasks that are present in
the system already at start-up and (ii) tasks that are only
introduced after the mode change (e.g., as fail-safes for one
or more tasks that were dropped). Figure 1 illustrates this
model, with one task for each kind. Initially (i.e., in L-
mode), there exist 4 tasks in the system (τ1, τ2, τ4 and τ5,
encircled in green). All of those have different combinations
of criticality and importance. In L-mode, the system must be
provably schedulable as long as no task executes for more
than its corresponding WCET estimate for that mode (CLi ).
However, if any of those 4 tasks exceeds its CLi , then a
mode change is triggered. The low-importance tasks τ1 and
τ4 are then immediately dispensed with; the high importance
tasks τ2 and τ5 persist in the new mode. Additionally, high-
importance tasks τ3 and τ6 are added to the system, possibly
to compensate for the functionality of the dropped tasks. In
the H-mode, it has to be offline-provable that no task among
those present (τ2, τ3, τ5 and τ6, encircled in red), can miss
a deadline, assuming that these tasks execute for up to their
corresponding WCET estimate for the new mode (Ci). This
requirement also applies to jobs caught in the mode transition
(i.e., released before the mode change, but completing after
the mode change).
Note that our model imposes no constraint between the
number of (low-importance) tasks dropped at mode change
and the number of new (high-importance) tasks added to
the system after the mode change (e.g., to compensate for
their functionality). Neither is there any constraint on how
the attributes of those tasks (Di, Ti, Ci) can be related.
For convenience, a task present only in the H-mode can be
equivalently modelled, for schedulability analysis purposes,
as a task present in both modes, with CLi = 0. Meanwhile,
for low-criticality but high-importance tasks (i.e., for which
a WCET estimate CHi for H-mode execution needs to be
4In [11], Esper et al. discuss examples of abstract systems where a task’s
criticality does not reflect its importance.
Fig. 1: A Venn diagram illustrating the different types of tasks
in our task model, the modes that they can be part of and the
WCET estimates used for schedulability-testing purposes.
defined), we think that it is reasonable to use CHi = C
L
i . The
reason is that rare jobs that exceed this execution time can be
dropped, even in the H-mode (because the job is not critical)
but the task overall cannot be dropped (because it is important)
and its next job will arrive and be executed as normal. Still,
there is nothing in our model that prevents the designer from
specifying some other CHi > C
L
i for a low-criticality, but
high-importance, task τi. As for important tasks (λi = H)
that cannot tolerate even a single dropped job, this implies
that they are in fact high-criticality and need to be specified
as such by the designer (i.e., κi = H); their WCET estimates
for the H-mode would accordingly also need to be provably
safe.
Ultimately, CHi ≥ C
L
i , for every task that is part of the
H-mode.
III. UNIPROCESSOR ANALYSIS
Having introduced the task model, we proceed with showing
how schedulability analysis formulated for the standard mode-
based Vestal model can be mapped to it. The only change to
the equations is that the task selector for the different modes is
now the task importance. For illustration purposes, we assume
a uniprocessor system and a fixed priority scheduling policy.
For this case, and for the standard mode-based Vestal model,
the literature offers the well-known AMC-rtb and AMC-max
tests (both formulated in [15]). For schedulability testing in L-
mode, for both AMC-rtb and AMC-max, a task’s worst-case
response time (WCRT) is upper-bounded by
RLi = C
L
i +
X
⌧j∈hp(i)
⇠
RLi
Tj
⇡
CLj (1)
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where hp(i) is the set of higher-priority tasks and CLj is the
WCET estimate for τj in L-mode.
For the schedulability testing in H-mode, the WCRT equa-
tions, for AMC-rtb and AMC-max, respectively, are
RHi = C
H
i +
X
⌧j∈hp(i)
j=H
⇠
RHi
Tj
⇡
CHj +
X
⌧`∈hp(i)
`=L
⇠
RLi
T`
⇡
CL` (2)
and
RHi = max(R
s
i ), ∀s ∈ {0, R
L
i } (3)
where
Rsi = C
H
i +
X
⌧`∈hp(i)
`=L
✓⌊
s
T`
⌫
+ 1
◆
CL`
+
X
⌧j∈hp(i)
j=H
⇢
M(j, s, Rsi )C
H
j +
✓⇠
t
Tj
⇡
−M(j, s, Rsi )
◆
CLj
}
(4)
where
M(j, s, t) = min
⇢⇠
t− s− (Tj −Dj)
Tj
⇡
+ 1,
⇠
t
Tj
⇡}
(5)
Under the new model, what changes is that, in the degraded
mode, the subset of tasks executing consists of all tasks
with λj = H (high importance) instead of κj = H (high
criticality). However, it still holds that CHi ≥ C
L
i , for every
task that is part of the H-mode. Correspondingly, Equation (1)
need not be modified at all, whereas Equation (2) (AMC-rtb)
is slightly modified to
RHi = C
H
i +
X
⌧j∈hp(i)
λj = H
⇠
RHi
Tj
⇡
CHj +
X
⌧`∈hp(i)
λ` = L
⇠
RLi
T`
⇡
CL` (6)
and Equation (4) is changed to
Rsi = C
H
i +
X
⌧`∈hp(i)
λ` = L
✓⌊
s
T`
⌫
+ 1
◆
CL`
+
X
⌧j∈hp(i)
λj = H
⇢
M(j, s, Rsi )C
H
j +
✓⇠
t
Tj
⇡
−M(j, s, Rsi )
◆
CLj
}
(7)
with Equations (3) and (5) entirely unaffected. We typeset
the modified Equations (6) and (7) with the affected terms
in oversized red, in order to highlight how minimal and how
straightforward the changes are. Note that the schedulability
test for AMC-max is still safe even when it has to be
guaranteed that jobs caught in the mode transition of tasks
that are to be dropped shall not be terminated if they do not
exceed their L-mode WCETs5. This property of AMC-max
also holds under our model, if, due to design requirements,
such semantics need to be enforced.
Adapting other schedulability tests for the standard mode-
based Vestal model (e.g., for an EDF scheduling policy, with
uniform [7] or per-task [8] deadline scaling), is analogous.
IV. MAJOR MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE VESTAL MODEL
Having introduced our task model and shown how its
schedulability analysis is available “for free” from the liter-
ature on the standard mode-based Vestal model, we are going
to briefly examine to what extent its adoption settles some
criticisms voiced (e.g., in [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]) at the
standard mode-based Vestal model that inspired it. We also
use the opportunity to highlight why some other criticisms
are misframed.
A. Conflating the software assurance level of a task with the
notion of importance
In systems with criticality concerns, tasks are part of one
or more system components or functions, which in turn are
assigned assurance levels. In the automotive domain, these
are called Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) whereas in avionics,
Development Assurance Levels (DALs) are the equivalent
concept. Each task associated to a system component inherits
the latter’s SIL (DAL), with tasks belonging to multiple
components (or components that are not partitioned) inheriting
the highest SIL (DAL) thereof (see p. 10 in [16]). Tasks must
be developed in accordance with the rules defined for their
SIL/DAL.
As already mentioned, a major legitimate criticism (e.g.,
in [9]) on the mode-based Vestal model is that all tasks of
a higher-criticality system component (i.e., higher SIL) are
always given higher importance than the tasks of any lower-
criticality system component (lower SIL). In other words,
the importance of a task is treated as depending entirely on
its criticality level. In reality though, as the critics correctly
point out, some tasks of a higher-criticality component may
be unimportant tasks that simply “inherited” their higher
SIL due to their interaction/communication with other tasks,
whose failure would be catastrophic. Conversely, there may
be tasks in a lower-criticality component whose failure can be
catastrophic.
As explained, our proposed model decouples the concept of
criticality from that of importance. The system designer has
the flexibility to specify the importance of different tasks, in
accordance with the nature of the system, and decide on their
placement into the different modes of operation. Hence we
believe that this fully resolves the particular criticism.
5Quoting from the original AMC-max paper [15]: “For a possible alterna-
tive system model (in which all low criticality tasks, that have been released
but not yet completed, are allowed to consume up to C(L) before being
descheduled) this bound is tight.”
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B. Graceful degradation
Graceful degradation of the system has been recommended
in safety standards (e.g., IEC61508), whereby the system is
allowed to enter in a degraded mode with limited services
without compromising its safety. The conventional techniques
for the mode-based Vestal model aim for graceful degradation
by dropping the low-criticality tasks, under the implicit as-
sumption that these are the less important tasks. However, as
explained, importance is not just a function of the criticality
level, as it may also depend on the mode of operation and
application context. Hence, one valid criticism is that this is a
flawed attempt at graceful degradation.
Our proposed model allows the system designer to define
a degradation policy based on the importance of each task,
irrespective of its criticality and mode of operation. The system
designer can thereby specify which tasks are to be dropped,
kept or added at each mode transition.
C. WCET estimates
It has been noted (e.g., in [10], [17], [11] that nowhere do
the safety standards foresee the existence of multiple WCET
estimates for the same task, and that this would bring into
question the compatibility of the mode-based Vestal model
with these standards. To this observation, we counter that (as
also noted in Section I) this is a terminological issue, even
for the standard mode-based Vestal model [15]. What in the
literature of the Vestal model are refered to as additional, non-
provably-safe “WCET estimates”, are in fact execution time
thresholds whose excedance triggers the switch to the next
mode. The consequence of setting such a threshold too high
or too low (by using an execution time estimation technique
that is, correspondingly, more/less conservative) is, respec-
tively, inefficient platform utilisation vs. greater likelihood
of triggering a mode change (which is also undesirable). It
is a design tradeoff, and both in the standard mode-based
Vestal model [15] and ours, nothing prevents the designer
from specifying a provably safe WCET estimate for a task
in all modes that it is part of. The fact that these estimates
tend to be conventionally called (simply) “WCETs” by the
people in the real-time scheduling community, obscures their
true nature. However, this usage simply follows from the fact
that they do behave like WCETs, when they are input into the
schedulability tests that the researchers construct.
As Baruah already noted [18], even if the standards do not
explicitly foresee the use of multiple execution time estimates
per task, they offer no technical arguments precluding their use
either, as part of a technique devised for proving the desired
safety guarantees for the system. Which is why he surmises
that objections to the use of multiple execution time estimates
“seem in large part to be a social and cultural problem, rather
than a technical one” [18].
D. Temporal and spatial isolation
The mixed criticality applications hosted on the same mul-
ticore platform can (in the absence of mechanisms preventing
this) interfere with each other on multiple shared channels, in-
cluding CPU, caches, memory buses, memory controllers and
I/O devices [19]. Many mitigation and prevention techniques
are proposed in the literature to eliminate or predictably reduce
the interference among applications of different criticality.
Several works already exist [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25],
[24], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [13], [33] on
ensuring temporal and spatial isolation. Some of these works
already explicitly assume the mode-based Vestal model while
the others can still work in its context. For instance, server-
based techniques can be used to ensure temporal isolation
at the CPU level [23]. The Cache Lockdown approach [34],
[35] proposed in the context of the SCE framework [22]
allows spatial isolation at the cache level. Similarly, the use
of MemGuard [20] (and memory access regulation in general)
allows for upper-bounding memory-access-related stalls and
integrating them into the scehedulablity analysis.
Recently, a concern has been raised [11] that a misbehaviour
in the minimum interarrival time of a task can affect the
temporal isolation of a mixed-criticality system. We believe
that further study is required within the context of the mode-
based Vestal model to address this challenge of variation in
the minimum interarrival time of a task. One way to deal with
this, entirely in accordance with the spirit of the mode-based
Vestal model, would be for such an inter-arrival time violation
to trigger a mode change, analogously as done with execution
times. Certainly, the literature contains works which consider
the change of interarrival time parameters in mixed-criticality
systems in different modes (e.g, [36]). Baruah also shares
our view that, rather than just execution times, the theory
pertaining to the Vestal model “could be used to deal with any
form of inherent uncertainty and nondeterminism with regard
to the run-time behavior of systems” [18].
E. Mode switch
In an industrial context, the term “criticality” refers to the
level of assurance (SIL, DAL or ASIL) applied in the software
development process of the safety-critical application. In the
standard mode-based Vestal model, the term is “overloaded” to
represent two additional concepts: the mode of operation and
importance of a task. The latter comes from the (contested)
assumption, in that work [15] that a task’s importance is
solely determined by its criticality. With respect to the former
“overloaded” meaning, when a system switches from mode
n to mode n + 1, this does not really mean that the tasks
change their criticality from criticality n to criticality n + 1;
it just refers to the transition in mode of operation. Despite
the confusing terminology, the criticality of any application or
task is not changed due to the mode transition.
Nevertheless, we recommend to other researchers in a-
cademia to use that term “mode of operation” rather than, e.g.,
“low system criticality” when refering to the mode, to avoid
any confusion. Moreover, the decoupling of criticality from
importance in our proposed model eliminates the concerns
about the misuse of the term “criticality” to indicate the
importance. Finally, it is worth emphasising that, in any case,
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this misuse of the term has no impact on the validity of the
existing analyses for the mode-based Vestal model.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced a variant of the mode-based Vestal task
model for mixed-criticality systems, in order to address some
criticisms about the model and bridge the gap with current
industrial practice. Its main feature is the decoupling of
task criticality from task importance. The new model retains
the essence of its predecessor (run-time robustness and effi-
cient processor utilisation via flexible mode transition), and
it remains fully backwards compatible with all its existing
analyses. We also pointed out how this new model settles
the concerns voiced about Vestal’s mode-based model and its
terminology.
To conclude, although we have no intention of discouraging
anyone from exploring other techniques and paradigms, we
believe that any issues or points of concern pertaining to the
Vestal model, can be resolved in accordance with its spirit,
and do not necessitate a break from it. We intend to work
with others in the community in order to further refine the
Vestal model, to not only make it more nuanced with respect to
the current incarnations of the safety standards, but ultimately
also to influence the drafting of future standards. Remote as
this may seem today, it would not be that dissimilar to what
happened with fixed-priority scheduling, which took many
years and enormous effort by many people until it became
endorsed by the standards and established industrial practice.
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